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Comes now the Plaintiff and appellant, by and through its counsel of record, and makes 
this appellate brief. 
STATEMENT OF PARTIES 
Plaintiff and Appellant - Capital Assets Financial Services 
Defendants and Appellee - Jordanelle Development LLC and Bruce Riches 
Defendant, Jared M. Jensen, filed for bankruptcy prior to the final order at the trial 
court, and pursuant to the bankruptcy stay, Plaintiff is no longer pursuing its claim 
against Mr. Jensen in this litigation. 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
Pursuant to Utah Code § 78A-3-102(3)(j), the Utah Supreme Court has jurisdiction 
to hear this appeal from a Utah District Court. Under Utah Code §78A-3-102(4), the 
Utah Supreme Court has authority to transfer this matter to the Utah Court of Appeals, 
which authority was exercised in transferring this case. The Utah Court of Appeals has 
appellate jurisdiction over "cases transferred to the Court of Appeals from the Supreme 
Court." Utah Code§78A-4-103(2)(j). 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES 
The issue on appeal is whether prior encumbrances should be considered in 
assessing the fair market value of real property foreclosed through a secondary deed of 
trust. 
"In order to preserve an issue for appeal, the issue must be presented to the trial 
court in such a way that the trial court has an opportunity to rule on that issue." 438 Main 
Street v. Easy Heat, Inc., 2004 UT 72, P51 (Utah 2004). The opportunity to rule on the 
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issue in this appeal was given to the trial court. Plaintiff argued in its opposition to the 
motion to dismiss that "the fair market value of the subject property should be assessed in 
light of the remaining encumbrances." See Opposition to Defendant's Motion to Dismiss 
at 2. In support of its argument, Plaintiff cited to applicable law, including Utah Code 
§57-1-32 and City Consumer Servs. v. Peters. See Opposition to Defendant's Motion to 
Dismiss at 2. 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
"A district court's grant of a motion to dismiss based upon the allegations in the 
plaintiffs complaint presents a question of law that [the appellate court] review[s] for 
correctness." Osguthorpe v. Wolf ML Resorts, L.C., 2010 UT 29, P10 (Utah 2010). 
"A district court should only grant a motion to dismiss when a plaintiff is not 
entitled to relief either under the facts alleged or under any state of facts they could prove 
to support their claim. Accordingly, when determining whether to grant a defendant's 
motion to dismiss, a court must assume the truth of the allegations in the pleadings and 
draw all reasonable inferences from those allegations in favor of the plaintiff." Gloria 
Hayley Ashby v. Dallen Ben Ashby, 2010 UT 7, f 9 (Utah 2010). 
RELEVANT STATUTORY PROVISIONS 
"At any time within three months after any sale of property under a trust deed as 
provided in Sections 57-1-23, 57-1-24, and 57-1-27, an action may be commenced to 
recover the balance due upon the obligation for which the trust deed was given as 
security, and in that action the complaint shall set forth the entire amount of the 
indebtedness that was secured by the trust deed, the amount for which the property was 
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sold, and the fair market value of the property at the date of sale. Before rendering 
judgment, the court shall find the fair market value of the property at the date of sale. The 
court may not render judgment for more than the amount by which the amount of the 
indebtedness with interest, costs, and expenses of sale, including trustee's and attorney's 
fees, exceeds the fair market value of the property as of the date of the sale. In any action 
brought under this section, the prevailing party shall be entitled to collect its costs and 
reasonable attorney fees incurred." Utah Code §57-1-32. 
"Transfers in trust of real property may be made to secure the performance of an 
obligation of the trustor or any other person named in the trust deed to a beneficiary. All 
right, title, interest and claim in and to the trust property acquired by the trustor, or the 
trustor's successors in interest, subsequent to the execution of the trust deed, shall inure to 
the trustee as security for the obligation or obligations for which the trust property is 
conveyed as if acquired before execution of the trust deed." Utah Code §57-1-20. 
'The trustee who is qualified under Subsection 57-1-21(1 )(a)(i) or (iv) is given the 
power of sale by which the trustee may exercise and cause the trust property to be sold in 
the manner provided in Sections 57-1-24 and 57-1-27, after a breach of an obligation for 
which the trust property is conveyed as security; or, at the option of the beneficiary, a 
trust deed may be foreclosed in the manner provided by law for the foreclosure of 
mortgages on real property. The power of sale may be exercised by the trustee without 
express provision for it in the trust deed." Utah Code §57-1-23. 
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This appeal is from a final judgment of the Third District Court in a civil lawsuit 
in which the plaintiff was seeking to obtain a deficiency judgment after foreclosing the 
defendants' property through a third position deed of trust. The defendants prevailed at 
the trial court on a motion to dismiss. The motion to dismiss was based on the argument 
that the fair market value of the real property involved in this dispute exceeded the 
amount of indebtedness owed to Plaintiff and that Plaintiff was therefore barred from 
pursuing a deficiency judgment. Plaintiff argued that prior encumbrances need to be 
considered when calculating the fair market value of real property foreclosed through a 
secondary deed of trust. Plaintiffs argument was supported by citations to statutory 
language, case law, and public policy. There are no related or prior appeals in this case. 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
1. Defendants signed a note, partially secured by a deed of trust, with Plaintiff as the 
beneficiary. See Complaint at 5, 12, and 13. 
2. Defendants defaulted on the note, and Plaintiff foreclosed on the property that was 
partially secured by the deed of trust. See Complaint at 7, 10, 12, and 13. 
3. At the time of the foreclosure auction, Defendants owed $1,491,295.89 to 
Plaintiff. See Complaint at 12. 
4. At the time of the foreclosure auction, the gross value of the foreclosed property 
was $2,000,000.00, and the encumbrances with priority over Plaintiffs trust deed 
totaled $1,159,617.81. See Complaint at 13. 
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5. Plaintiff purchased the trust deed's property with a bid of $1,000,000.00. See 
Complaint at 11. 
6. At the time of sale, the combined value of purchase price and the remaining 
encumbrances was $2,159,617.81, which is $159,617.81 more than the trust 
deed's property was worth. See Complaint at 11 and 13. 
7. At the conclusion of the foreclosure auction, the balance still owing by Defendants 
to Plaintiff was in the amount of $491,295.89. See Complaint at 14. 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
Prior encumbrances should be considered when assessing the fair market value of 
a property foreclosed through a junior deed of trust because: 
1. In discussing deficiency judgments, the Utah Supreme Court has stated that fair 
market value should be calculated according to the amount that the indebtedness 
exceeds the security foreclosed. Whether an amount is secured or unsecured is 
dependent on the prior encumbrances in the collateral, and Plaintiff's right to be 
made whole cannot be destroyed by other encumbrances. 
2. The "Fair market value" is what a person is willing to pay for the real property. 
Prior encumbrances change what a person is willing to pay for the real property. 
Therefore, prior encumbrances change the fair market value. 
3. The court-stated public policy behind the deficiency limitation is to prevent the 
lender from procuring a double recovery by bidding a menial amount for the 
property at the foreclosure, then attempting to collect the entire remainder of the 
7 
debt owed on the promissory note. This policy would not be served by enforcing 
the deficiency limitation as wrongly interpreted by the defendants. 
4. Enforcing the deficiency limitation as wrongly interpreted by the defendants 
would create bad public policy including making it substantially more difficult to 
borrow and lend money in Utah, forcing lenders to bring lawsuits against debtors 
in order to collect the entire amount owed to the lenders, and placing foreclosing 
lenders in a position where they can only recover a percentage of what is justly 
and duly owing to them. 
5. Deficiency judgments are only limited in that the court may not render a judgment 
in which the amount of the indebtedness exceeds the fair market value of the 
property. Regardless of whether the fair market value considers the prior 
encumbrances, Plaintiff is not asking for a judgment that exceeds the fair market 
value of the property. 
Based on each of these reasons individually, let alone cumulatively, Plaintiffs 
appeal should be granted and its case remanded to the district court. 
ARGUMENT 
The Plaintiff and Appellant requests that the court overturn the motion to dismiss 
granted by the district court. Plaintiff believes that the district court misapplied the 
deficiency limitation set forth in Utah Code §57-1-32, which states: 
"At any time within three months after any sale of property under a trust 
deed.. .an action may be commenced to recover the balance due... The 
court may not render judgment for more than the amount by which the 
amount of the indebtedness.. .exceeds the fair market value of the property 
as of the date of the sale." Utah Code §57-1-32. 
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Under this statute, the fair market value of the foreclosed property would include 
the prior encumbrances that remain on the property after foreclosure. 
I. THE UTAH SUPREME COURT INDICATES THAT COURTS 
SHOULD LOOK AT THE VALUE OF THE SECURITY IN 
CALCULATING A DEFICIENCY JUDGMENT, AND THE VALUE 
OF THE SECURITY IS CONTINGENT UPON THE HOW MUCH 
OF THE COLLATERAL HAS BEEN ENCUMBERED PRIOR TO 
THE SECURITY AT ISSUE. 
The Utah Supreme Court explained the deficiency limitation as follows: "A 
deficiency judgment after the sale of the security is limited to the amount by which the 
amount of the indebtedness exceeds the fair market value of the security foreclosed on at 
the time of foreclosure." City Consumer Servs. v. Peters, 815 P.2d 234, 238 (Utah 
1991)(underlining added for emphasis). Looking at the security rather than the 
foreclosed property as a whole makes perfect sense because Plaintiff did not sell the 
foreclosed property outright but simply sold Plaintiff's interest in the foreclosed property 
which interest was in the third-position. 
The court further explained: "If the security is lost or has become valueless at the 
time the action is commenced, the debt is no longer secured." Id. at 237. The choice of 
words by the court and subsequent explanation that we should look to whether there is 
value to secure a debt is important. In the City Consumer case, the court did not treat all 
trust deeds as equal. Rather, the court held that a junior encumbrance "should not be 
denied full recovery of its debt since the security of the mortgaged land has entirely 
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disappeared." Id. at 239 [quoting U. S. B. & M. Liquidation Corp. v. Hilton, 307 Mass. 
114, 117 (Mass. 1940)]. 
The case at hand is similar to the City Consumer case. Due to the prior 
encumbrances, Plaintiff's deed of trust was only partially secured. As a result of the 
partial security, Plaintiff could not be made fully whole through foreclosure. As in the 
City Consumer case, Plaintiffs right to be made whole is not destroyed simply because 
there is another party with a greater right to the collateral than Plaintiff. The Plaintiff can 
only be made whole after the Plaintiff receives sufficient compensation to be made 
whole. Under the facts alleged in Plaintiffs complaint, Plaintiff would only recover half 
of what it is owed by selling the property at its fair market value. Plaintiff is therefore 
entitled to a deficiency. 
II. FAIR MARKET VALUE IS CALCULATED BASED ON WHAT A 
PERSON WOULD ACTUALLY PAY FOR THE PROPERTY, AND 
SINCE PRIOR ENCUMBRANCES CHANGE WHAT A PERSON 
WILL PAY FOR THE PROPERTY, THESE ENCUMBRANCES 
CHANGE THE FAIR MARKET VALUE. 
'The accepted formula for determining fair market value is what would a 
purchaser willing to buy, but not required to do so, pay; and what would a seller willing 
to sell, but not required to do, ask." Utah Dep't ofTransp. v. Rayco Corp., 599 P.2d 481, 
489 (Utah 1979). 
Encumbrances on property change what a party is willing to pay for a property. 
The effect of encumbrances on purchase price is manifest in real estate purchase options. 
For example, some properties are sold in wrap-around mortgages in which the buyer 
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merely assumes responsibility for the encumbrances on the property. Short-sales have 
also become common-place. In a short sale, a property cannot be sold by traditional 
means because the encumbrances on the property exceed the assessed value of the 
property, and a buyer will not pay the assessed value for a property that would be 
encumbered by pre-existing obligations after the purchase. In order to sell the home, the 
encumbrance-holder must take a lesser amount than it is owed in exchange for releasing 
its encumbrance. In both wrap-around mortgages and short-sales, the encumbrance has 
an effect on what the buyer is willing to pay for a property. 
Plaintiff is in a similar situation. A buyer at the foreclosure of a third-position deed 
of trust would take the property subject to the pre-existing encumbrances. See Utah 
Code §57-1-20 and Utah Code §57-1-23. In other words, in order to own the property 
outright after purchasing the property at the foreclosure, the buyer would still need to pay 
off the two encumbrances ahead of Plaintiffs third-position deed of trust. 
Conversely, if the first-position deed of trust were foreclosed, then the buyer at the 
first-position foreclosure sale would own the property outright. See Utah Code §57-1-20 
and Utah Code §57-1-23. Due to the greater ownership right conveyed and the 
extinguishing of the inferior encumbrances, the foreclosure of the first-position deed of 
trust would fetch a higher price than the foreclosure of Plaintiffs third-position deed of 
trust. 
Plaintiffs argument in this section can be summarized in a classic "a=b, b=c, and 
therefore, a=c" logic statement: The fair market value is what a person is willing to pay 
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for the property. Prior encumbrances change what a person is willing to pay for the 
property. Therefore, prior encumbrances change the fair market value. 
Since, the prior encumbrances change the fair market value of the real property, 
Plaintiff may collect the deficiency judgment owed by defendants. 
III. PLAINTIFF HAS NOT MADE A MENIAL OFFER FOR THE 
PROPERTY AND IS NOT SEEKING DOUBLE RECOVERY, SO 
USING THE DEFENDANTS9 INTERPRETATION OF "FAIR 
MARKET VALUE" WOULD NOT FURTHER THE COURT-
STATED POLICY BEHIND THE DEFICIENCY LIMITATION. 
Citing other courts in support of its position, the Utah Supreme Court explained 
the policy behind the deficiency limitation in Utah Code §57-1-32: 
"The purpose of the fair market provision of section 57-1-32 'is to protect 
the debtor, who in a non-judicial foreclosure has no right of redemption, 
from a creditor who could purchase the property at the sale for a low price 
and then hold the debtor liable for a large deficiency, (fair market value 
provisions 'designed to prevent creditors from buying in at their own sales 
at deflated prices and realizing double recoveries by holding debtors for 
large deficiencies')." Id. at 238 (quoting First Sec. Bank, N.A. v. Felger, 
658 F. Supp. 175, 183 (D. Utah 1987) and Roseleaf Corp. v. Chierighino, 
378 P.2d 97, 99 (Cal. 1963). 
In the case before this court, Plaintiff did not place a menial bid for the property 
and is not seeking double recovery. In fact, if Plaintiff was to sell the property for the 
assessed value, Plaintiff would receive in total about $840,000 in compensation, which is 
just over half of what Plaintiff is owed (even though $1,000,000.00 would be accredited 
against the Defendants' amount owing due to Plaintiffs excessive credit bid). This is not 
a situation in which Plaintiff has been made whole and is seeking a double recovery; this 
is a situation in which Plaintiff has not been made whole. Treating secondary 
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encumbrances like first-position encumbrances would not further the court-stated policy 
behind the deficiency limitation. 
IV. USING THE DEFENDANTS9 INTERPRETATION OF "FAIR 
MARKET VALUE" WOULD CREATE BAD PUBLIC POLICY 
THAT WOULD: 1. MAKE IT SUBSTANTIALLY MORE 
DIFFICULT TO BORROW AND LEND MONEY IN UTAH, 2. 
FORCE LENDERS TO JUDICIALLY FORECLOSE BY BRINGING 
A LAWSUIT AGAINST DEBTORS TO COLLECT THE FULL 
AMOUNT OWING, AND 3. PLACE FORECLOSING LENDERS IN 
A POSITION WHERE THEY CAN ONLY RECOVER A 
PERCENTAGE OF WHAT IS JUSTLY AND DULY OWING TO 
THEM. 
Treating secondary encumbrances like first-position encumbrances would create 
bad public policy. First, it would make it substantially more difficult to borrow and lend 
money. A creditor would only be willing to extend a loan if there was an excessive 
amount of collateral after the prior encumbrances. In today's current market, it is 
impossible to watch the news without seeing repeated stories on the difficulty in taking 
out loans and the negative impact this difficulty has had on the economy. Treating 
secondary encumbrances like first-position encumbrances would exasperate this problem. 
Second, if non-judicially foreclosing on a property would cause a lender to forfeit 
its right to full recovery, then lenders would be forced to judicially foreclose by bringing 
a lawsuit against debtors to collect the full amount owing. This approach would be 
detrimental to the creditors who suffer increased costs and delays, to the debtors who will 
be forced to defend against lawsuits and pay the increased costs, and to the courts who 
would be burdened by the influx of cases. 
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Third, treating secondary encumbrances like first-position encumbrances would 
hinder the enforcement of contracts. Under contract law, lenders are entitled to full 
recovery under the terms in which they loan out money. If the court treats secondary 
encumbrances like first-position encumbrances, then secondary lenders will be placed in 
a precarious situation in which they will have to choose between attempting to collect the 
amount owed and non-judicially collecting through the partially-securing collateral. 
Some lenders will collect through the collateral and forfeit their rights. This danger of 
forfeiture is particularly unfair to lenders who have foreclosed or are foreclosing on 
property without knowledge that they are forfeiting their claim to the entire amount that 
they are owed. Lenders should be allowed to enforce their contracts to collect the entire 
amount they are owed and collect on the collateral that secures these contracts. 
V. PLAINTIFF IS NOT ASKING FOR A JUDGMENT THAT 
EXCEEDS THE FAIR MARKET VALUE OF THE PROPERTY, 
AND THEREFORE, THE DEFICIENCY LIMITATION DOES NOT 
APPLY. 
Finally, the defendants have asked the court to read the deficiency limitation very 
strictly. Under a strict reading, the deficiency limitation only limits that "the court may 
not render judgment for more than the amount by which the amount of the 
indebtedness.. .exceeds the fair market value of the property as of the date of the sale." 
Utah Code §57-1-32. In the matter at hand, Plaintiff's complaint does not ask the court 
to grant a judgment for more than the amount that the amount of indebtedness exceeded 
the fair market value at the date of the sale. Plaintiffs complaint asks for judgment in the 
amount of $491,295.89, which is less than the fair market value of the property under 
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either the defendants' or the Plaintiffs calculations. Under the strict reading advocated 
by the defendants, Plaintiff would still be able to collect on its deficiency judgment. 
CONCLUSION 
Plaintiff should be allowed to collect on the deficiency owed after foreclosing on 
its third-position deed of trust. The encumbrances ahead of Plaintiff changed what a 
person would pay for the securing property and thereby changed the fair market value of 
the securing property. Using the encumbrances in calculating the fair market value is in 
line with the Utah Supreme Court's approach when it stated that courts need to look at 
the particular security in the foreclosed property and that a lender should be entitled to 
full recovery when another encumbrance prevented the lender from being secured. The 
policy behind the deficiency limitation, specifically preventing lenders from obtaining 
double recovery by bidding low amounts at a foreclosure, would not be furthered by 
ignoring the prior encumbrances and forcing the Plaintiff to forfeit half of its claim. 
Additionally, it would create bad policy for the court to prevent Plaintiff from seeking a 
deficiency judgment in that it would make borrowing and lending money more difficult, 
increase litigation for loans, and prevent lenders from being able to enforce their 
contracts and collect the entire amount owed. Finally, the deficiency limitation only 
prevents Plaintiff from seeking a judgment for more than the indebtedness exceeds the 
fair market value of the property, and Plaintiff is seeking a judgment for less than the fair 
market value of the property. 
Plaintiff humbly requests that the court grant its appeal and remand this case back 
to the district court. 
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lisG^t Dated thiskyt^ day of J«»? 2010 
Stephen W. Whiti 
Attorney for Ap 
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THIRD DISTRICT COURT-SUMMIT 
APR 0 8 2010 
FILED B Y _ 
BRYAN W. CANNON #0561 
STEPHEN W. WHITING #11828 
BRYAN W. CANNON & ASSOCIATES, P.C. 
Attorney for Creditor 
8619 S. Sandy Parkway, Ste. I l l 
Sandy, Utah 84070 
Telephone: (801)255-7475 
Facsimile: (801) 255-7526 
File Reference No. 90020052 
THIRD DISTRICT COURT, STATE OF UTAH 
SUMMIT COUNTY, SILVER SUMMIT DEPARTMENT 
CAPITAL ASSETS FINANCIAL 
SERVICES 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
JORDANELLE DEVELOPMENT LLC, A 
COLORADO LIMITED LIABILITY 
COMPANY, JARED M. JENSON, AND 
BRUCE RICHES 
Defendant. 
ORDER GRANTING 
ATTORNEY'S FEES TO 
DEFENDANTS 
Civil No. 090500770 
JUDGE LUBECK 
Comes now the court and pursuant to the stipulation of the parties and the court's ruling on 
Defendants' motion to dismiss, grants an award of attorney's fees against Plaintiff and in favor of 
Defendants in the amount of $2 J 60.00. 
DATED this day of April, 2010. 
Approved as to form by: 
The Honorable Judge Lubeck1 
lawn Potter 
"Attorney for Defendants 
ADDENDUM B 
MEMORANDUM DECISION 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR SUMMIT COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
CAPITAL ASSETS FINANCIAL 
SERVICES, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
JORDANELLE DEVELOPMENT, LLC; 
JARED M. JENSEN; and BRUCE 
RICHES, 
Defendants. 
RULING and ORDER 
Case No. 090500770 
Judge BRUCE C. LUBECK 
DATE: January 26, 2010 
The above matter came before the court on January 12, 2010 
for oral argument on defendants' motion to dismiss. 
Plaintiff was present through Stephen W. Whiting and 
defendants were present through Shawn W. Potter. 
Defendants filed this motion on September 29, 2009. 
Plaintiff filed an opposition response on October 14, 2009. 
Defendants filed a reply on October 15, 2009, as well as a 
request to submit. Based thereon oral argument was scheduled. 
Oral argument was held and the court took the issues under 
advisement. Before the hearing the court carefully considered the 
memoranda and other materials submitted by the parties. Since 
taking the issues under advisement, the court has further 
considered the law and facts relating to the issues. Now being 
fully advised, the court renders the following Ruling and Order. 
BACKGROUND 
Plaintiff filed a complaint September 2, 2009. It alleged a 
deficiency after a trustee's sale of property and sought 
$491,295.89 plus interests and costs of sale. 
This motion followed. 
ARGUMENTS 
Defendants move to dismiss under URCP, Rule 12(b)(6). 
Defendants allege that on July 31, 2009, a trustee's sale 
occurred and plaintiff was the highest bidder in the sum of $1 
million. The complaint alleges that the property was worth $2 
million, with prior liens at just over $1.1 million. 
Based on those claims, the Utah statute limits deficiency 
judgments by requiring offset of the fair market value such that 
if the amount of indebtedness does not exceed the fair market 
value, there is no deficiency. UCA 57-1-32. Defendants also ask 
for attorney fees. 
In opposition plaintiff alleges there are two encumbrances 
on the property after the sale; a deed of trust of October 1, 
2004 and one of August 10, 2005. The foreclosed loan was in the 
third position. The amount due and owing on the first loan was 
-2-
$560,849 and on the second $451,444. 
Plaintiff agrees that a deficiency is limited to the amount 
by which the indebtedness exceeds the fair market value, but 
asserts the fair market value should be assessed in light of 
remaining encumbrances. The balance of the two prior liens owing 
was just over $1 million. Subtracting that from the fair market 
value of $2 million, brings the actual fair market value below 
the $1 million paid by plaintiff. 
In reply defendants argue that encumbrances do not offset 
the fair market value. UCA 57-1-32 does not define fair market 
value, but the term means what a willing buyer and willing seller 
would allow for property to change hands. No cases nor statutes 
define fair market value as plaintiff asserts. The purpose of 
UCA 57-1-32 is to protect a debtor, who has no right of 
redemption, from a creditor who could buy low and seek a large 
deficiency judgment. 
DISCUSSION 
"A rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss admits the facts alleged 
in the complaint but challenges the plaintiff's right to relief 
based on those facts." St. Benedict1s Dev. Co. v. St. Benedict's 
Hosp., 811 P.2d 194, 196 (Utah 1991)(citing 61A Am. Jur. 2d 
Pleading § 227 (1981)). Accordingly, the court must determine 
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whether, assuming the facts as alleged in the Plaintiff's 
complaint as true, they have failed to state a claim upon which 
relief can be granted. 
Assuming the facts as stated by Plaintiffs as true, they 
have failed to assert a claim for a deficiency judgment under the 
Utah law. >NWhen faced with an issue of statutory construction, 
we look first to the plain language of the statute and assume 
that each of its terms was used advisedly.'' Surety Life Ins. Co. 
v. Smith, 892 P.2d 1, 5 (Utah 1995). 
Before rendering a deficiency judgment, 
the court shall find the fair market value of 
the property at the date of sale. The court 
may not render judgment for more than the 
amount by which the amount of the 
indebtedness with interest, costs, and 
expenses of sale, including trustee's and 
attorney's fees, exceeds the fair market 
value of the property as of the date of the 
sale. 
UCA 57-1-32 (2009) . The statute plainly states "a deficiency 
judgment after the sale of the security is limited to the amount 
by which the amount of the indebtedness exceeds the fair market 
value of the security foreclosed on at the time of foreclosure.7' 
City Consumer Servs. v. Peters, 815 P.2d 234, 238 (Utah 1991) 
Therefore, Plaintiff is entitled to a deficiency judgment 
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only if the amount of Defendants' indebtedness on Plaintiff's 
loan, with interest, and the trustee's fees and costs, exceed the 
fair market value of the property at the date of the sale. UCA 
57-1-32. Defendant's obligation was $1,491,295.89 and the 
trustee's fees and costs were $1,152.88. Even with the interest, 
these do not exceed the fair market value of $2,000,000. 
The fair market value does not include the prior 
encumbrances on the property under Utah law or even based on 
common sense as Plaintiff asserts. Although not defined in Title 
57 of the Utah Code, it is well-established under Utah law that 
the fair market value is "the amount at which property would 
change hands between a willing buyer and a willing seller, 
neither being under any compulsion to buy or sell and both having 
reasonable knowledge of the relevant facts." UCA 59-2-102. 
Plaintiff, as the highest bidder at the trustee sale, and any 
other potential buyer, had known about the prior encumbrances and 
presumably took that into consideration along with the fair 
market value of the property. The fact that Plaintiff ended up 
in the present situation was a risk they took as a third-position 
lender. 
Additionally, as Defendants state, "the purpose of the 
deficiency purpose of the fair market provision of section 
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57-1-32 'is to protect the debtor, who in a non-judicial 
foreclosure has no right of redemption, from a creditor who could 
purchase the property at the sale for a low price and then hold 
the debtor liable for a large deficiency.'" Peters, 815 P.2d at 
238 (quoting First Sec. Bank of Utah, N.A. v. Felger, 658 F. 
Supp. 175, 183 (D. Utah 1987)), 
Finally, as the prevailing party, Defendants are entitled to 
reasonable costs and attorney fees: MIn any action brought under 
this section, the prevailing party shall be entitled to collect 
its costs and reasonable attorney fees incurred." UCA 57-1-32 
On this basis the court GRANTS Defendants' motion to 
dismiss Plaintiff's deficiency action. 
This Ruling and Order is the Order of the court and no other 
order is required. However, defendant is to prepare an order 
awarding attorney fees to defendant, with the amount blank. It 
should be supported by an affidavit sufficient under Rule 73. 
Plaintiff may object to the affidavit and the court will then 
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fill in the blank as to fees awarded. 
DATED th i s ^ day of_ , 2010, 
BY THE.COURT 
BRUCE C. LUBECK 
DISTRICT COURT JUD-
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